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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on a challenge in the current terrorism literature,
namely the methodological justification concerning the collection and
analysis of empirical data. Lack of detailed methodological accounts of
the collection and analysis of the data makes it difficult to evaluate
presented findings, especially if these data are confidential or focused
on specific aspects of the phenomenon. This article offers an extensive
overview of the methodological procedures conducted in a large
empirical research project on jihadist networks based on confidential
police files (2000–2013), interviews, and trial observations. The article
illustrates how grounded theory–based methods can be used to
collect and analyze such data and to develop and test new theories in
this research field.
The stream of academic publications on terrorism and radicalization has rapidly grown over
the last two decades and several scholars have provided thorough reviews of the adopted
approaches and applied methods over the years.1 Some academics argue that the field of ter-
rorism studies has developed positively,2 whereas others sound a note of warning about the
status quo of terrorism studies.3 The following section reviews the main arguments of both
strands and builds on this by introducing an important challenge in this field, namely the
methodological justification. Although not at the center of the preceding discussions, clarity
on methodological choices concerning the collection and analysis of empirical data definitely
deserves more attention in terrorism research. In this article we highlight the necessity of this
information and encourage researchers to incorporate sufficient information about the data
collection and the methods applied when presenting their research findings. In a large study
on the development of the jihadist movement, we used classified police files from the period
2000 to 2013, and additional interviews and trial observations as data sources. We will show
how we used grounded theory methods to systematically collect and analyze these complex
data, and how this combination of data and methods led to new insights in this research
field.
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Strengths and Weaknesses
The field of terrorism studies has developed positively over the years due to creative and
innovative approaches, leading to more high-quality research.4 Despite inherent difficulties
and restrictions in obtaining empirical data, researchers have been able to gain first-hand
data by conducting interviews with perpetrators of terrorism,5 participant observations
among radical extremists,6 or analysis of classified government information.7 In addition,
other scholars have been able to transform open source data into extensive research data-
bases that are suitable for systematic analysis of terrorist events.8 Beyond innovative data
gathering, terrorism scholars have also successfully pushed the boundaries to analyze these
data. Statistical9 and social network analyses10 have become more common among terrorism
scholars, which in turn had a considerable impact on the validity and reliability of many
research findings. Besides the fact that analytical perspectives from other disciplines like
criminology11 have increased, this is partly due to augmented interdisciplinary research col-
laboration.12 Through the receptivity of terrorism research for new methods and perspec-
tives, quality research will be further amplified in the future.
However, leading scientists seem to disagree on the impact of these developments. Critical
terrorism scholars, for instance, argue that the dominance of terrorism issues in the political
and media domains has blurred an objective view on the phenomenon.13 This has led to,
among other issues, methodological problems, a lack of self-reflexivity, political subjectivity,
state-centricity, and problem-solving-orientation due to dependence on state-sponsorship.14
Although these allegations are debatable,15 it is clear that the positive image of methodologi-
cal developments in this research field is not unanimously shared among terrorism scholars.
In contrast with Silke,16 Sageman even claims that terrorism research has stagnated.17 Sage-
man argues that scholars fail to generate solid evidence in their studies, due to governments’
unwillingness to grant academics access to classified data. As a result, scholars often rely on
open sources such as media accounts, official government statements, and reports, which, he
claims, tend to be biased and inaccurate.18 Sageman’s strong statement has been contested
by several prominent scholars, who offer legitimate counterarguments.19 While we recognize
that the use of different data sources and analyses certainly contributes to the developments
in this field, we do agree with Sageman that academic access to classified government data-
bases, and the implementation of academic analytical skills to analyze such data, could con-
tribute to the field of terrorism studies.
Methodological Justification
Although the literature mentioned above shows that terrorism research is progressing in
multiple ways, there is definitely room for improvement. The present article focuses on a
specific challenge in this research field, namely the methodological justification of the data
collection, measurement, and analyses. This justification is needed to validate the findings
and conclusions presented. Horgan20 and Freilich et al.21 emphasize that terrorism scholars
need to be aware of (and transparent about) the required procedural steps and research pro-
tocols when reporting their results. Whereas many qualitative studies comply with this
call,22 this is still too often not the case. In mostly qualitative studies, the presence of a
detailed description of how the data are collected, measured, and analyzed is definitely not
always complete. This means that it is difficult to determine the methodological rigor of
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these studies. To illustrate, several academic studies that (claim to) use extensive empirical
data did not include separate methodology sections in their papers, or omitted an account of
the empirical strategy that was used to conduct the research.23 If the methodology section is
present, it sometimes only gives an account of the source of the data. An explanation on the
data collection, the inclusion criteria used to select relevant data, and the number of docu-
ments or data sources analyzed is not always present.24 More importantly, procedural and
analytical steps underlying research findings and conclusions are not always accounted
for.25 Coding efforts are, for instance, often unspecified, in spite of their essential role in
qualitative analysis. Apart from the presence or absence of a methodological section, it is
also important to be clear about the foundation of a particular finding when reporting
results. Too often it is unclear whether a finding or conclusion is supported by multiple sour-
ces and whether the data contain sufficient evidence to draw such conclusions. For example,
some scholars repeatedly refer to an “interview with confidential source” without numbering
these interviews.26 As a result, the reader does not know whether information comes from
the same source, or from multiple respondents.
Insufficient clarity about the methods and analytical tools has important implications.
When it remains unclear how scholars analytically arrive at their conclusions, it is difficult
to assess the scope, reliability, and validity of these conclusions. Foremost, it may impede the
development of high-quality terrorism research. Because the devil is in the detail, the reader
may be unable to evaluate a study on its genuine merits and may raise the question whether
scholars have indeed analyzed their data with rigor. In other words, the findings could come
across as selective and subjective. It can also lead to insufficient practical utilization of higher
quality research if policymakers have little confidence in the results. In the same vein, less
well-designed research can be over-evaluated, which can lead to supposedly evidence-based
countermeasures that do not fit the addressed phenomenon well in reality. Although we
acknowledge that methodological justification has increased significantly over the years, it is
still not a given fact. We believe that reporting on the actual methods used, needs to become
common practice to get terrorism research in position to shape the debate, both in academia
and in society.
Grounded Theory
To illustrate how this could be done, even with confidential data, we offer a transparent over-
view on how we conducted our research in a large research project on jihadist networks in
the Netherlands (2000–2013). We will elaborate on specific analytical steps, derived from
Grounded Theory (GT) methods, which were taken to study classified police files. In general,
GT methodology offers suitable analytical tools to conduct systematic analysis of complex
qualitative data, and has been successfully applied by several scholars in the field of terrorism
studies.27 GT methodology aims to generate a theory that is built on theoretical concepts or
categories that emerge from the data and is particularly suitable for explorative research.
A key strength of GT methods is, in the words of Bryant and Charmaz,28 that it offers a
“foundation for rendering the processes and procedures of qualitative investigation visible,
comprehensible, and replicable.” At the core of this foundation are two basic principles,
which are constant comparative analysis and theoretical sampling.29 The former involves the
continuous comparison between data and emerging concepts during each stage of the
research. The latter refers to the process where preliminary findings from initial data
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gathering uncover tentative concepts, which in turn direct the collection of new independent
data. This additional data is then used to validate or falsify the initial concepts that emerged
from the original dataset. This article aims to offer clear analytical insights by reporting
extensively about the procedures that need to be conducted to adhere to these two basic
principles. These procedures are sampling, coding, categorizing, memo writing, and theoriz-
ing, which need to be conducted simultaneously and continuously throughout the
research.30 Thoroughly carrying out these procedures will aid the systematic data analysis,
which is considered a primary and essential feature of GT methodology.31 Theoretical state-
ments that are generated without regard for systematic data collection and analysis are con-
sidered “immaculate conjectures.”32
Indisputably, transparent and systematic analyses are not exclusively assigned to GT
methods, and we neither claim that GT methods are more transparent than other qualitative
methods, nor that they are better analytical tools. Yet, we favored GT methods in this
research project because the underlying methodological or epistemological foundation best
matched the research goals of this project. In this research project we were not so much
interested in the why of jihadist behavior, but more in the how. We aimed to understand
how jihadist networks operate and how this changed over time. Moreover, we sought new
insights and the development of new explanatory models. To reach this explorative goal, we
prefer an approach that allows gathering data with an open mind than being bound by pre-
determined theories. This is the cornerstone of GT. To illustrate, Glaser and Strauss33 intro-
duced GT as a response to the dominant positivist epistemology of their time. They
questioned the deductive approach that solely focused on the verification of prior assump-
tions and hypotheses derived from existing theories.34 Instead, Glaser and Strauss supported
an inductive approach that aims to generate a theory built on theoretical concepts or catego-
ries that emerge from the data. This approach ignores prior assumptions and neglects the
use of hypotheses. The reason for this, they stated, is that researchers should be able to gen-
erate theories on their own, instead of becoming “proletariat testers” of the “theoretical capi-
talists.”35 Since this matches our research interest, we favored GT methods over deductive
alternatives.
There is not just one absolute GT though. Diverging perspectives on the analytical proce-
dures, for instance, ended the collaboration between Glaser and Strauss.36 Furthermore, new
versions of GT were developed and a distinction was made between Glaser and Strauss’s
objectivist and Charmaz’s constructivist GT methodology. This resulted in different perspec-
tives on the ideal GT end-product. Nonetheless, the different schools all share a similar
methodological process and all conduct similar analytical procedures to generate their theo-
ries.37 We are primarily focused on the use and usefulness of these common procedures in
terrorism research. Hence, we do not strictly follow one of the three approaches, although
the methods applied in the research project are nonetheless more in line with Charmaz’s
constructivist approach. The reason for this is that, unlike the objectivists, we acknowledge
that our findings are not necessarily objective facts, but are interpretations of documents
and reflections from the respondents. Moreover, based on these interpretations and reflec-
tions, we have developed particular ideas and conceptualizations that could not have
emerged from the data without our interference. Unlike the objectivists’ opinion, we can
therefore not be seen as completely neutral observers who inductively discovered particular
concepts directly from the data.38 Also, unlike the objectivist GT, we are not aiming to
develop formal theories. Rather, we seek new insights that might explain or illuminate the
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situation studied, but these insights do not necessarily have to be developed into general the-
ories that clarify other situations. In the same context, we also do not aim to develop a core
category that summarizes all observations into a single explanation because we acknowledge
that there is probably more than one. Hence, we focus on more categories or mechanisms in
the various studies of this research project, which is more in line with Charmaz’s construc-
tivist approach.
Data Collection
Since we aimed to answer broad and explorative research questions about how jihadist net-
works operate in the Netherlands and how their modus operandi developed over time, we
needed rich data sources that could offer insight into such processes.
Police Files
To see how jihadist networks operate, the ideal method would probably be a form of par-
ticipant observation. However, because jihadist networks are covert and clandestine, it is
highly questionable whether the network participants would cooperate.39 Moreover,
safety would be an issue and many ethical issues would arise. We therefore directed our
focus towards a qualitative document analysis of Dutch police files and court files. Such
files yield highly valuable but foremost rich information that could fulfill our broad
research needs. As other terrorism scholars have indicated as well,40 the thickness of
information in police files and court documents is unprecedented. The police files con-
tain the original wiretaps of both telephone and Internet communication, recordings of
in-house communication, transcripts of suspect interrogations, witness statements, obser-
vation reports, forensic reports, reports of house searches, expert-witness reports, but
also (when archived correctly) the complete and verbatim court transcripts and lawyers’
pleas. The police files contain extensive information on the operational aspects of clan-
destine networks, because the police can unobtrusively follow and observe the partici-
pants of these networks without their knowledge, which bypasses the need for
cooperation.41 Furthermore, since the files we studied covered a longer time-frame, we
were able to look for possible developments. Nonetheless, since the use of these types of
data also comes with limitations (see “Limitations” below); we do not claim that such
files are better than other kinds of (open) sources. It rather matches our research inter-
ests. The raw observation material in the files, for instance, enabled us to monitor how
people behave and communicate with each other.42 This is an empirical advantage that
is hard to attain on the basis of media reports or even direct interviews. Moreover, police
files yield more complete information than the excerpts from court transcripts that are
often found in the media or online. The information in these police files concerns the
underlying data on which criminal investigations and court cases are built. To conclude,
police files render useful primary data according to GT, since they are suitable to portray
empirical events.43
In total we had access to 28 voluminous police investigations that focused on jihadi ter-
rorism between 2000 and 2013, which led to 19 official criminal cases that were sent to the
Dutch Public Prosecution Service (as several police investigations were merged into one
criminal case). In these 19 criminal cases we identified 14 jihadist networks, which means
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that—contrary to the police—we merged criminal cases if they focused on the same net-
work.44 In addition, we conducted the collection of data from these police files in accordance
with the basic principles of GT methodology, because we collected the data during different
periods. The first tier of data, which yielded 12 police investigations (or 7 criminal cases),
was collected between May 2006 and May 2008.45 Based on preliminary findings from the
first tier, a second tier of data was gathered between July 2012 and December 2013, which
initially resulted in 10 police investigations. However, due to the eruption of the Arab Spring,
the emergence of particular categories, and the uncertainties of a criminal case, we decided to
add six additional police investigations at a later stage. As a result, we analyzed a total of 16
police investigations (or 12 criminal cases). At the same time, this dispersed data collection
allowed us to adopt a longitudinal perspective. The first tier of data covered the period
2000–2005, while the second tier of data eventually covered the period 2005–2013. Table 1
shows how the various criminal cases are spread over the different years. Based on these
data we were able to analyze how the modus operandi of jihadist networks developed over
time. The selected police investigations focused on several hundred individuals, which we
reduced to a total of 209 subjects. We did not copy police categorizations, but determined
our own inclusion criteria.46 The 209 subjects included are not necessarily terrorist perpetra-
tors or suspects. The basic inclusion criteria were that: (1) an individual expressed extremist
Salafi-jihadist sympathies or explicitly facilitated such a sympathizer; (2) we were able to
gather information on the subject beyond his/her personal details, and (3) the subject lived
or regularly resided in the Netherlands or played an indispensable role in a network operat-
ing in the Netherlands.
In order to gain access to the police files, formal permission from the Board of Procura-
tors-General was requested for both tiers of data. At the same time, an advisory board was
assembled, entailing representatives from the Dutch National Police, the Dutch National
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, the Dutch Intelligence Agency, and the
Dutch Public Prosecution Service. The representatives were all terrorism experts within their



















1 1 1 29 2000–2001 Terrorist attack 1 2
2 2 2 22 2001–2003 Terrorist attack 2 2
3 1 10 2002–2003 Foreign fighting 1 No contact
4 1 6 2002 Foreign fighting 2 No contact
3 5 1 11 2003–2005 Terrorist organization 2 No contact
4 6 5 48 2003–2005 Terrorist organization 2 4
5 7 1 3 2004 Terrorist attack 2 No contact
6 8 2 22 2005 Terrorist organization 2 2
7 9 2 26 2006 Terrorist organization 3 2
8 10 3 3 2001–2003 2006–2008 Terrorist financing 1 No contact
9 11 1 7 2007–2008 Terrorist attack 1 No contact
10 12 1 31 2008–2013 Terrorist organization 1 No contact
13 1 1 2008 Terrorist attack No contact
14 1 4 2008 Foreign fighting 2 No contact
15 1 4 2009 Foreign fighting 1
11 16 1 17 2010 Foreign fighting 2 Refused
12 17 1 3 2011 Foreign fighting 1 No contact
13 18 1 2 2011–2013 Foreign fighting 3 No contact
14 19 1 6 2012–2013 Foreign fighting 1 1
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organizations. In addition, biannual meetings were organized with the experts to reflect on
our research progress during both data collection periods and to verify whether we complied
with rules of data anonymity. Nonetheless, they respected our academic integrity and did
not interfere with the reporting of our research findings. Initially they informed us about the
availability and variety of police investigations relating to jihadist networks and they enabled
us to physically access the police files. The police investigations from the first tier constitute
an initial sample of which the inclusion criteria were the richness of the data and representa-
tiveness for different moments in time. The police investigations of the second tier were pur-
posefully selected based on similar criteria and based on the categories rising from the first
tier. We will illustrate this in the Data Analysis section. GT methods allow purposeful sam-
pling, because they maximize variation of meaning.47
After consultations with the advisory board, we started the data collection at various loca-
tions of both the National Police and the Public Prosecution Service. Our working space was
either a separate room near the executives or we were allowed to settle among them, depend-
ing on the person in charge. We used a personal and secured laptop to safely record the data.
This data collection was a very labor-intensive task due to the volume of the police files,
which entailed thousands of pages per police investigation.48 Eventually, it took several years
to complete the data collection. In order to structure and guide this endeavor, a digital docu-
mentation sheet was used. The documentation sheet was merely to aid the researcher and to
secure information from the police files into a format that could be used for future analyses.
This sheet contained a variety of themes, such as the investigation timeline, subjects’ personal
traits, division of roles, network characteristics, radicalization and recruitment processes, net-
work activities, subject’s environment, transnational connections, financial aspects, convic-
tions, religious behavior, and ideology. Each theme had several open questions that enabled
the researcher to zoom in on certain aspects of the police files. Consequently, we inserted
summaries of relevant information from the police files into the digital documentation sheet
or we copied multiple excerpts from wiretap or interrogation transcripts. The documenta-
tion sheet was not a static research tool. We adjusted the sheet when it appeared to omit
important themes or questions that emerged from the data. During the first tier of data col-
lection we noticed the occurrence of subjects’ flexible ideological behavior.49 This was not
yet a central theme in the initial documentation sheet, which we therefore inserted later on.
On the other hand, possible activities such as suicide bombings were removed from the doc-
umentation sheet when it appeared that these activities did not occur in the Netherlands. As
a result, through evaluation and constant comparison of data, we were able to continuously
modify the documentation sheet. This approach is in accordance with more advanced ver-
sions of GT methodology, which acknowledges that a researcher has acquired certain ideas
and perspectives about the world through education and prior reading. As a result, a
researcher develops so-called sensitizing concepts, which are interpretive devices that func-
tion as a starting point to look at the data and to prepare interviews.50 The themes in the
documentation sheet are such tools or devices, which we derived from studying prior terror-
ism and organized crime51 research. The themes were used to develop further understanding
of the phenomenon and not to limit it. Furthermore, the themes were broken down in very
general research questions, which were used to keep a focus at particular items that might be
interesting. Hence, these themes and questions were not formulated to test hypotheses, but
merely to guide our study of jihadist networks. When new questions arose, they were added
to the documentation sheet.
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Semi-Structured Interviews
The rich data derived from the police files did not always provide enough context and
required additional clarification. Also, due to our interpretation of the files, tentative catego-
ries emerged from the police files that needed validation or falsification. Therefore, we con-
ducted additional semi-structured interviews with both the police investigators and the
public prosecutors involved in drafting the criminal cases in order to enhance a comprehen-
sive understanding of the studied jihadist networks. We aimed at interviewing one police
investigator and one public prosecutor per criminal case, although the numbers varied
between cases. In total we interviewed 22 respondents, which we have outlined per criminal
case in Table 1. Some respondents were interviewed multiple times, whereas some interviews
were held with more than one respondent. All interviews were conducted by means of a
semi-structured questionnaire, with themes similar to the documentation sheet. The ques-
tionnaire was adjusted per interview to cover a particular criminal case. The interviews
yielded useful information and the respondents provided valuable contextual information.
The interview procedures slightly differed per tier of data collection. During the first tier,
the interviews were conducted at the start of the police file data collection. Besides the
themes, the respondents were also asked whether all relevant data was included in the police
files and if they recognized the tentative categories that we derived from other police investi-
gations. This way we verified whether the selected police files indeed covered a particular
jihadist network and whether the tentative categories had actual ground. Also, we sometimes
contacted the respondents again by telephone after we finished the data collection in order to
clarify issues that remained ambiguous. We dispersed the timing of the interviews during the
second tier. The first interview was conducted soon after we started our collection of data
from the police files, while the (optional) second interview was conducted at the end of the
data collection. This dispersion gave us more room to familiarize with the investigation
before the first interview, and discuss and clarify issues in depth during the second interview.
It also enabled us to adjust the questionnaire in relation to the police investigation studied
and the categories that emerged from it, adhering to the GT principles.
Despite this thorough and varied data collection, we noticed that not all emerging ques-
tions could be answered with data from police investigations. For instance, within the first
tier of data we found that irregular immigrants were disproportionally present within jihad-
ist networks.52 Unfortunately, we could not directly derive from the police investigations
what made the jihadist networks so attractive to irregular immigrants. Therefore, we con-
ducted 23 additional semi-structured interviews with Imams (n D 10) and staff members
(n D 13) from Dutch Asylum Centers (AC) and Detention Centers (DC). In this way, we
tried to draw a picture of the lives of irregular immigrants and asylum seekers prior to their
jihadist involvement. The interviews with staff members were conducted by means of a
semi-structured questionnaire, which focused on items such as general information on AC/
DC, background of asylum seekers/irregular immigrants, socioeconomic factors, living condi-
tions, and religious behavior. Because the decision to conduct interviews was based on the
initial findings from the police files, and because we constantly compared each interview
with additional interviews and with the data from the police files, the additional data collec-
tion was in line with the principles of GT methodology.
Our primary data obviously relied heavily on the investigative authorities. Despite several
features, such as our access to raw data, the inclusion of reports from examining judges, and
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the inclusion of lawyers’ pleas, we admit that our data can be perceived as overly dependent
on officials interested in prosecution. Therefore, we interviewed several criminal defense
lawyers who could shed a different light on the court cases.53 As contact details of the law-
yers were not always available, and because several lawyers did not cooperate or respond to
our request, we were able to interview 6 criminal defense lawyers about the cases in which
they were involved. Although this is a small number, together they represented a fair portion
of our criminal cases.54 Several of them had been working in this area of expertise for more
than a decade and they had represented multiple cases and defendants over the years. As a
result, most lawyers were able to provide valuable insights over a longer period, if not the
entire period. These interviews were also conducted by means of a semi-structured question-
naire, which was slightly adjusted per interview to cover the relevant criminal cases. We pro-
vided the respondent with our findings and interpretations of the central themes (i.e.,
emerging categories) discussed above. Thus we were able to validate our interpretation of
the data from the police files and it provided the lawyers the opportunity to refine our con-
clusions. Besides the fact that this procedure adheres to the GT principles, this was also nec-
essary to ensure lawyer–client confidentiality. By laying bare the details of a case, we did not
put lawyers in a position in which they would disclose confidential information.
Finally, the interview settings and logistics were all similar, regardless of the type of
respondent. The interviews were conducted at the personal offices of the respondents, or pri-
vate areas were arranged in case the respondents did not have a personal office. In this way,
all interviews could proceed without interruptions from external factors. In addition, we
guaranteed all the respondents that they—and the people they spoke about—were anony-
mized in our publications. With this promise we had permission to tape record all interviews
(except for the interview with the Imams), which we then transcribed verbatim. The inter-
views lasted about 75 minutes on average, but varied between 45 and 100 minutes overall.
The 10 Imams were interviewed in the setting of a focus group. Although we wished to inter-
view them one-by-one, for logistical reasons permission was only granted for a focus group
interview. During this focus group session, we discussed the main findings from the inter-
views with the staff members and verified whether the Imams noticed similar situations.
This appeared to be a good starting point for the Imams to speak from their own experien-
ces. This interview was not tape recorded, but immediately transcribed by a research
assistant.
Trial Observations
A final data source we deployed was the regular attendance of the criminal court hearings,
which enabled us to see the suspects in person and gain a more vivid impression of their sit-
uation. Furthermore, because the suspects were questioned at trial, they might disclose new
information, which could be added to the data. Also, when suspects were not temporarily
detained and allowed to await trial in freedom, they were present in the public areas of the
courthouse prior to and after the hearings and during the breaks. This enabled us to briefly
speak with suspects, although none of them agreed to participate in a formal interview. On
the other hand, it did bring us into contact with several criminal defense lawyers, which led
to the aforementioned interviews. Overall, each of the criminal cases had several court hear-
ings, spread over several months. The court hearings contained several kinds of hearings
such as pre-trial reviews, court examinations, verdicts and sentencing sessions.
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Unfortunately, we were not able to attend all court sessions, because many criminal cases
were already closed at the time we started the research or were never brought to a Dutch
court. We were able to attend more than 10 court hearings of only 4 different criminal cases.
We did, however, obtain most of the verbatim court transcripts from the court sessions we
did not attend. Hence, we were aware of many additional statements from the suspects. To
conclude, attending those hearings opened doors for further data sampling (i.e., interviews
with lawyers), and enabled us to compare our preliminary findings with additional informa-
tion that was disclosed during a court session, again adhering to GT principles.
Data Analysis
The triangulation of these different data sources led to significant new insights in jihadist
networks. To discover and develop these insights, we analyzed the data simultaneously with
the collection of data, leading to the identification of emerging categories. The emergence of
preliminary categories initiated separate sub-studies within the greater research project on
jihadist networks and at the same time directed further data collection on jihadist networks.
In order to transparently illustrate how coding data led to the emergence of categories in
more detail, we focus on one particular sub-study. In that particular project we studied so-
called jihadist involvement mechanisms that enhance, discourage, and sustain possible affilia-
tion with a jihadist network. In the following section we will on the one hand give an analyti-
cal overview of the data coding process at a more general level. On the other hand, we will
provide analytical transparency on a more concrete level by illustrating how such coding led
to the emergence of categories in the study on jihadist involvement mechanisms. When we
refer to that study, we change to italicized sections. It must be stressed that we only show
brief results, derived from a more extensive publication on this issue. Furthermore, we
divided the analyzing process into two procedures, namely (1) coding and categorizing and
(2) identifying relationships between the categories.
Coding and Categorizing
One of the crucial procedures in GT methodology is coding, which Charmaz defines as
“naming segments of data with a label that simultaneously categorizes, summarizes, and
accounts for each piece of data.”55 Codes offer a handle to interpret the data and to develop
ideas about the data. In other words, a code is the link between the data and the final publi-
cation of findings. To arrive at this stage, the codes must first develop into categories and
concepts, which can be viewed as higher level codes that have grown in complexity. Catego-
ries or concepts incorporate multiple codes and these codes eventually become the properties
of categories. The aim of collecting and analyzing data is to achieve theoretical saturation,
which means that no more properties of the defined categories will emerge when new data
are added. Although there are different interpretations about what constitutes a code or a
category,56 the codes and the categories are the core of the analysis. Initial and focused coding
needs to be conducted to develop codes into an analytical framework.
We started using initial coding by zooming in on the documentation sheet with an open
mind while asking the open question: “what do these data say?” To record what is happening
in the data, we used a software program for qualitative data analysis, MAXQDA, to label seg-
ments of data (the information summaries and excerpts) by means of line-by-line and
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incident-by-incident coding. The former was predominantly used to code every sentence
from the transcribed interviews and the excerpts in the documentation sheets. Incident-by-
incident coding, however, was more suitable for the summaries from the police investiga-
tions, because summaries need to be interpreted as a whole (i.e., an incident), rather than by
each individual sentence. Hence, line-by-line coding would not be very convenient in that
context, because the summaries were often already expressed in our own words. Labeling
segments forced us to narrow our focus to the information, which enabled us to distinguish
and encapsulate pieces of relevant information into initial codes.
Several incidents in the police files highlighted how subjects communicated via multiple ways and
shared all sorts of knowledge along the way. For instance, the interrogations contained confessions
about how and what kind of material several subjects forwarded to others, while the wiretap tran-
scripts illustrated discussions between subjects about this matter. These incidents were coded line-
by-line with initial codes such as debating, attending educational gatherings, exchanging USB-
sticks (with radical sermons and films), lending (religious) books, sending suras, and distributing
factsheets emerged. These codes explicitly captured what was going on in the police files and
remained very close to the data.57
To remain open to other analytical possibilities we adopted an additional approach called
focused coding, which employs more directed, selective codes than initial codes. To develop
such focused codes, the initial codes were used to scrutinize newly acquired data. By actively
comparing the initial codes with the additional incidents, analytical thinking is encouraged,
which helps to determine whether initial codes are adequate or need adjustment. Codes that
are initially developed to capture a single incident influence the focus on the data such that
similar data can be noticed and compared, leading to clarification of the data. Through con-
stant comparing of data with data, data with codes, and codes with codes, focused codes can
be refined. This refining could imply that codes expand, and develop into a category. As
mentioned, categories are higher level codes and the focused codes are potential categories.
When we compared the initial codes that were derived from prior studied investigations with the
data from newly acquired investigations and the interviews conducted, we observed similar inci-
dents in the police files where subjects confessed, discussed, and held meetings to exchange knowl-
edge. As a result, the foregoing initial codes such as lending (religious) books, or attending
educational gatherings, for instance, were confirmed, sharpened, extended, and sometimes merged
into focused codes, because they were indeed capable of summarizing additional incidents and sit-
uations. Moreover, through constant comparison we found that some of these focused codes
together embodied a larger process, which was the distribution of ideological information. We
therefore merged several focused codes in one and raised it to the level of a preliminary category,
which we called “ideological information sharing.” The foregoing focused codes became the prop-
erties of this category. However, due to our longitudinal perspective, we also found that “ideologi-
cal information sharing” developed over time. Some properties were particularly present in earlier
police investigations, but not so much later on. For instance, the exchange of ideological informa-
tion moved from a physical to a virtual environment over time, causing properties such as
“exchanging USB-sticks” to be replaced by “sending ideological email attachments” in later
investigations.58
However, categories are also provisional and one must therefore examine the adequacy of a
category through theoretical sampling and constant comparison. This is done in a similar
fashion as with the initial codes. This way, robust categories that capture larger mechanisms
and processes can be developed. Furthermore, when the emerging categories are constantly
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compared, a set of initial categories often functions as properties or sub-categories of a
higher level concept or category.
We found that “ideological information sharing” was not an independent category. When we
compared it with several other preliminary categories, like “establishing brotherhood” and “boast-
ing,” we found that together these categories actually embodied a larger concept or category, which
we called “encouraging involvement.” This category stands for a process that supports a new
recruit to remain associated with a jihadist movement, and the preliminary categories became
sub-categories or properties of “encouraging involvement.” One should notice that each higher
coding level becomes a more abstract term that covers a broader mechanism or process in compar-
ison to the lower level codes and incidents.59
It is important to stress that the individual sub-categories or properties of “encouraging
involvement” were supported by multiple segments of empirical data from a variety of inves-
tigations. This means that we did not focus only on seemingly interesting outliers, but kept
studying whether our initial ideas were supported by more data. As a result, we could draw
conclusions about this category that are grounded in the data.
Identifying Relationships between Categories
The development from initial codes to robust categories does not happen automatically, but
requires the researcher’s active analytical approach. The true analytical process is conducted
by means of memo writing, which is the intermediate stop between collecting data and writ-
ing drafts of papers.60 Memos are written brainstorms or narratives about the data, which
start developing as soon as the initial analysis of the data begins. Memos conceptualize per-
sonal ideas of researchers about what they came across.61 It is through memo writing that
data are actually compared with data, codes, and categories; and vice versa. In this respect,
memo writing is an analytical tool used to arrive at the conclusion that a provisional code or
category is valid or that additional data are needed. By writing memos the categories and
their properties are defined, specified, and elaborated.
Through memo writing, the relationships between categories are further defined, which is
the basis for a paper. Through sorting memos and visualizing relationships between catego-
ries, the analysis can be raised to a higher level, because the categories are integrated into elu-
cidatory social processes. These overall processes are grounded in the data, but may also
have a more general applicability. The following example illustrates the outcome of such an
analytical process.
By means of memo writing we analyzed the category “encouraging involvement” further. By jot-
ting down everything that came to mind about the category, we concluded that “encouraging
involvement” was dependent on another category that we later redefined as “discouraging involve-
ment.” That category contained properties such as “police arrests,” “hostile environment,” “boast-
ing,” “conflicts,” “pressure,” and “intimidation,” which were factors that could have a
discouraging effect on people to associate further with jihadist networks. This relationship was
partly revealed because these categories share amongst other things a similar (sub) property, called
“boasting.” On the one hand, boasting was used by subjects to convince new recruits of the higher
goal of the movement and to convert inconvenient arguments of likeminded subjects into better
ones. Boasting was also used to overcome negative experiences and condemnations inflicted by
society. Hence, boasting was an encouraging mechanism regarding jihadist involvement. On the
other hand, however, we found that boasting was a tool during heavy debates and disputes, which
could fuel conflicts and even repudiation of fellow members. In that regard, boasting carried too
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far became a discouraging mechanism. By understanding this process of bravado and conflict,
used to rebel against the out-group, but also to dominate the in-group, boasting became an inter-
esting link between two important categories, and sharpened our understanding of the complex
jihadist involvement process.
The example above illustrates how continued coding, comparison, and memo writing
opened our eyes to interesting processes that we could not have been aware of prior to this
study.
Summary of Findings
Now that we have shown how the data were coded and how codes developed into categories,
we want to illustrate how these analyses led to new findings and insights by summarizing
some findings of three sub-studies that resulted from this research project.
The first example comes from the aforementioned study on involvement mechanisms.
In the first tier of data collection and analysis we initially coded several incidents where
older jihad veterans influenced younger subjects to internalize the ideology and become
radically involved. As a result, we first categorized these incidents as a top-down recruit-
ment process. Since we only found this process in the oldest criminal investigations, we
requested and analyzed later criminal investigations that explicitly prosecuted people for
terrorist recruitment in order to validate this process (i.e., theoretical sampling). We
found that as of 2004, the senior jihad veterans were replaced by young radicals. Instead
of direct recruitment, most jihadists now became involved through a process of self-radi-
calization and reciprocal peer influence in which some kind of power display and the
aforementioned boasting played an important role. When we compared these two dis-
tinct categories of involvement more closely, we noticed important parallels between
them. Regardless of one’s position or duration of involvement, we found that jihadists
had to deal with all sorts of encouraging as well as discouraging factors that affected their
jihadist involvement. Moreover, we found that the factors were in constant interaction
with each other, leading to a transformation process in which encouraging mechanisms
changed into discouraging mechanisms and vice versa. The aforementioned boasting and
conflict mechanism was a good example of this. On a more abstract level we therefore
theorized that jihadist involvement covers more than an initial entrance, and should
rather be seen as an unstable process that does not end with an alleged group
membership.62
A second sub-study relates to the earlier mentioned disproportionate presence of
irregular immigrants in the data. Trying to understand what it is that attracts irregular
immigrants to jihadist networks, we analyzed their profiles further. When comparing the
code immigration status with the focused codes network activity and ideological involve-
ment, we found that criminal conduct (as a core network activity) was often displayed by
irregular immigrants, who at the same time were less ideologically involved. To explain
this relation, we conducted the aforementioned interviews with imams and staff mem-
bers from Asylum Centers and Detention Centers (i.e., theoretical sampling) and found
that almost all irregular immigrants inhabiting these facilities suffered from mental issues
due to the relative deprivation caused by their immigration status. When comparing
these data with the foregoing codes or preliminary categories, we found that the type of
criminal activities conducted by these irregular immigrants, such as shoplifting and
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passport forgery, could actually satisfy their own needs. As a result, a theoretical concept
emerged from these preliminary categories, explaining that some members may not only
be attracted to the jihadist movement through ideological considerations, but also for
pragmatic reasons.63
The third example is a study into the pre-departure stages of foreign fighters. When scru-
tinizing the network activities we found that becoming a foreign fighter was a primary objec-
tive. We wanted to understand how jihadists established this and through constant
comparison of data from the first data tier we established five provisional categories; each
representing a different preparation stage. To validate whether these categories could be
found over time, we explicitly requested the Advisory Board for more recent criminal inves-
tigations that primarily focused on foreign fighting (i.e., theoretical sampling). Through this
additional collection of data we were able to distinguish different episodes and compare
these with regards to the pre-established categories or preparation stages. We found that
these provisional categories were valid in each episode, but the properties of the categories
differed between them. The more data we gathered, the more properties we could add or
redefine, thus identifying a difference in preparation over time. For instance, while the prop-
erty organized crime facilitated the operational stage in the first episode, common crime
became a prominent property in later episodes. However, through constant comparison we
also found particular parallels between the episodes, namely the fact that preparation was
mainly driven by situational factors. As a result, we developed a theoretical concept that clar-
ified how changing opportunity structures influence the preparation of jihadi foreign fight-
ers, thus explaining the differences in properties between episodes.64
Benefits of Combining Police Data and Applying GT Methods
Although we only gave a brief summary of some research findings, the findings illustrate
how the combination of police data and GT methods has methodologically contributed to
the field of terrorism studies.
Benefits of Police Data
The added value of using police files, interviews, and trial observations as primary data
can be found in its scope and nature. First, it offers an extreme amount of information,
as we have shown in the data collection part. The eyes of the police can reach much fur-
ther into the lives and operations of alleged terrorists and criminals than many other
sources would have been able to. The wiretap transcripts, for instance, are unparalleled
and provided incredible amounts of information that could be analyzed for academic
purposes, provided that they were sufficiently anonymized. Second, police data enabled
us to scrutinize covert activities that would not have been easily accessible via other sour-
ces. For instance, the police files provided extensive information on crime, which was
useful to understand how foreign fighters financially covered their expenses. Also,
through scrutinizing criminal conduct we were able to link irregular immigrants to jihad-
ist networks, a finding that is likely to have remained hidden when using other data
sources. In addition, the aforementioned wiretap transcripts offered an insight into secre-
tive jihadist-to-jihadist communication that would have been difficult to monitor via
other means. It was especially useful with regards to the discovery of boasting and other
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forms of power display between the subjects. Surely, open social media accounts can be
monitored nowadays, which could draw the attention to forms of display of power
between the subjects, but this has only recently become a possibility. Due to our longitu-
dinal perspective, we were also able to study private communication through in-house
communication and telephone lines in much older police files during a time when com-
munication between jihadists did not occur openly online.
Benefits of GT Methods
The added value of applying GT methods in our research can first of all be found in the
focused data collection. Due to constant comparison we were much more aware of the kind
of data we needed to sharpen and enhance our understanding of a particular phenomenon.
Via theoretical sampling we conducted additional interviews in the irregular immigrant
study and we requested from the Advisory Board additional investigations with regards to
both the foreign fighting study and the study on involvement mechanisms. As a result, we
were able to validate or falsify preliminary categories such as the pre-departure stages in the
foreign fighting study and the top-down recruitment category in the involvement paper.
Due to our explicit awareness of what type of information we wanted to test, we were also
able to identify developments over time in those studies. A second benefit is that GT meth-
ods allow us much more room to develop new insights on a higher abstraction level. Such
insights would have been less likely to emerge if we had used a deductive approach from the
start. With deductive methods the study area is delimited by a hypothesis, which guides con-
scious choices concerning the data collection as well as the variables and concepts that are
tested. With such approach it would have been less likely that we would have acquired the
aforementioned theoretical insights.
Limitations
Limitations of the Data
The illustrated method is labor intensive and time consuming, which could be a practical
limitation. Furthermore, the most prominent limitation of studying police files is the selec-
tion of information. The police do not cover all jihadist activities and not everything that is
relevant to understand the jihadist networks is encapsulated in a police investigation. As a
result, our 28 police investigations are a selection of a selection and can therefore not be seen
as representative. The same applies to the chosen time-frame. Although we covered a rela-
tively long period from 2000 to 2013, we did not analyze all jihadi activity during that period.
Also, even if the police cover the majority of jihadi activity and although we had formal per-
mission to access and analyze police files, we were still dependent on the cooperation of the
police and the public prosecutor. We were unable to verify whether we were indeed provided
with all the available documented information. Additionally, the interviews suffered from a
selection bias. As Table 1 shows, the number of interviews is not proportionate to the num-
ber of cases we studied. Unfortunately we were not able to interview all the people we aimed
at. We did not structurally interview two respondents per criminal case and we also did not
interview all lawyers involved. Although this limitation was beyond our control, it may have
affected our perspective on the phenomenon.
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The data might also be partially biased due to the context in which a (terrorism)
police file is constructed. Terrorism cases are often believed to be formed and influenced
under political pressure,65 leading to misplaced labeling of groups and individuals as ter-
rorists. This did not necessarily affect our research though, because we did not copy the
labels from the police files. Rather, we used the information provided by the police and
classified each individual or group under our own terms (see data collection). We there-
fore refer to people as subjects, rather than terrorists, and we even disclaimed several
alleged terrorism cases that to our standards had little to do with terrorism or jihadist
networks. In general, the construction of a police file can also be influenced by investiga-
tion policies. The initial goal of the police files is to convince the judge and is therefore
not supposed to be used as scientific data. Suspect interrogations are controlled and
orchestrated by the police, which, according to Althoff,66 results in “forced” communica-
tion by the suspects. Whereas some subjects revealed everything they knew in order to
be cooperative, others may have twisted reality or disclosed as little as possible to avoid
conviction. This implies a biased perspective and therefore police data must be handled
with much caution. However, the recorded confidential communication between subjects
cannot be regarded as “forced communication,” because in most cases the subjects were
unaware of the fact that they were being monitored. However, there always remains a
possibility that the final reports were filtered in order to persuade the judge. Althoff
reminds us that “court files are a construction of social reality in the context of criminal
law,” as the offender perspective and circumstances are primarily formulated through
the lens of the authorities.67 Despite this accurate notion, we were to a great extent able
to check the data ourselves, because we had access to the original transcripts. We there-
fore scrutinized this material intensively, and, as a result, relied on our own qualifica-
tions. In addition, we triangulated the information with other sources that offered a
dissenting opinion, which enabled us to nuance our perspective. For instance, interview-
ing lawyers and studying their pleas clearly provided us with an alternative or altered
perspective on the case. The same applies to the trial observations and scrutinizing court
transcripts. In court, the various sources of information were assessed by a judge in the
presence of all relevant actors. If there was a case of distorted information, this would
have been the moment where opponents could protest. Furthermore, we also studied the
examining judges’ reports. In the Netherlands such judges already play an active role
during the investigation. They examine the pre-trial decisions made by the public prose-
cutor in order to protect the suspect and to ensure a fair process.
Finally, an important point for discussion concerns the replicability of the research; one of
the pillars of academic research and the main reason for a comprehensive methodological
justification. Although the use of classified police files seems an odd choice in this regard, it
may actually be a very suitable data source for a replication study. Although police files are
not openly accessible, every researcher can request a formal admission. Other researchers
are free to follow the same route as we did and apply for exactly the same police files. Fur-
thermore, such police files are relatively static data sources because all the information
included is archived. This means that once a researcher has been granted permission to
access the files, he or she will find the exact same data as we did and will be able to replicate
our study. It must be stressed that the Dutch government is relatively liberal in comparison
to other countries when it comes to studying classified information by academics,68 and this
approach may therefore not be easily conducted elsewhere.
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Limitations of Grounded Theory Methods
Studies using Grounded Theory methods have encountered serious critique in the past.69
Probably the most problematic issue is the conceptualization of GT methods. Many
researchers claim to be using GT methodology or GT principles, but seem to confuse GT
with regular qualitative analysis.70 For instance, coding data is not enough to be regarded as
a GT method.71 As a result, the label of GT bears a semblance of methodological rigor, but
quite often detailed information on applied procedures is missing, which makes it difficult
to determine whether or not GT principles are applied. Therefore, we tried to be as explicit
as possible in this article to outline the different methodological steps. There is also an ongo-
ing discussion about what the end product of a GT study should look like.72 Since we do not
adhere to, for instance, the Glaserian approach that only approves formal theory building,
our study may not be characterized as a traditional GT study. However, other prominent
scholars such as Corbin and Strauss73 acknowledge that formal theory building should no
longer be the only end goal, and support the wider application of this methodology for dif-
ferent purposes.
On a more practical level, a debatable practice in our research is the revision of the docu-
mentation sheet while gathering data from the police files. Although this is entirely in line
with GT rules because it enhances theoretical sampling and constant comparison, it may
increase the selection bias as well. Since we were not always able to re-analyze the already
analyzed police files with the revised documentation sheet, this may have led to some under
or overrepresentation of results. Nonetheless, we tried to incorporate new issues in former
cases with the data still available to us. Another way to scrutinize new issues was the use of
an additional data source, such as interviews with key respondents.
Another critical issue in GT methodology is saturation. Theoretical saturation implies
that new information or incidents become interchangeable with earlier gathered data, which
means that there is no more room for further exploration of the defined categories.74 How-
ever, we are unable to make a claim of saturation yet, because it is difficult to determine
whether we have reached this point. Our data collection was limited by time, money, and
regulations and we cannot judge whether new aspects of the phenomenon would emerge if
the data collection would be continued, neither can we predict how the phenomenon will
develop over time. We did reach saturation on the studied cases, but cannot predict the
added value of expanding the data collection with new cases. Nonetheless, we could always
continue our research in the future. Additional research would furthermore be necessary to
validate or falsify our findings on a wider scale. Since our research has been limited to cases
from the Netherlands, our findings and the concepts developed are merely applicable to
those networks under scrutiny. Although we studied a significant number of cases and sub-
jects, the current findings and concepts have no general explanatory power until additional
research is conducted.
Conclusion
In this article we drew scholarly attention to a recurring shortcoming in current terrorism
research, which is the lack of methodological justification. By offering an overview of the
methodological procedures conducted in a large empirical research project on jihadist net-
works, based on confidential police files, interviews, and trial observations, we illustrated
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how analytical transparency can be achieved and how GT-based methods can be used to col-
lect and analyze such data and to develop and test new theories in this research field.
Despite considerable drawbacks of both GT-based methods and police data, we illustrate
how this combination of data and methods led to new insights on jihadist networks. The
combination of data and methods led to theories and conclusions that would have been diffi-
cult to achieve by other means. We do not claim that the use of GT methods and police files
are flawless methods, and it is not our intention to claim that this combination of data and
methods is better than other methodologies. We do, however, show that the combination of
police data and GT methods offers a suitable and complementary approach to the current
field of terrorism studies. In order for this research field to progress, researchers should be
encouraged to seek new types of data or analytical tools to complement conventional meth-
odologies. At the same time scholars should be transparent about the way they arrive at their
conclusions. In a field that yearns for systematic analysis and rigor, openness about how this
is established is more than a worthy pursuit.
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